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Parallel worlds: Male and female Islam in the Central Asian republics 
 
In Central Asia, independent religious activity has always existed parallel to and separate from  
state power and the institutions of shariat Islam. In the pre-Soviet era, Central Asian Muslims 
attended mosques where they listened to clerics interpret Islamic scripture. They turned to 
religious judges to settle personal disputes. They also took initiation from charismatic Sufi 
teachers who attracted small circles of followers, and maintained customary practices and 
domestic rituals, called urf-odat, within the context of their homes and communities. 
 
During the Soviet era, Sufism and other forms of independent religious engagement became 
illegal. Independent groups and their leaders either went underground or ceased to exist. Many 
ritual and customary practices could no longer be practiced openly. The only legal religious 
activity was performed under the supervision of Religious Boards, groups of conservative 
scholars appointed and supervised by the Soviet regime. 
 
Today, these restrictions have been lifted and Central Asia is experiencing a religious revival. 
Since independence, the region has been host to an influx of foreign religious workers, bringing 
every imaginable converting denomination in the world. Interest in the indigenous traditions is 
also increasing. The most visible revival movement is that of Islam. In Kyrgyzstan, where I did 
fieldwork, a rapid and broad expansion of Islamic infrastructure and education is being overseen 
by the Spiritual Leadership of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, or Muftiyat, the modern successor to the 
Soviet-era Religious Boards. The Muftiyat supervises all public Islamic observance and 
instruction. It registers congregations, designs the curricula of Islamic educational institutions, 
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licenses davaachylar (Islamic educators), approves religious books for publication, issues 
fatvalar, decrees, and appoints and supervises imamdar (leaders of local congregations) and 
kazylar (provincial leaders). Muslims of many generations and ethnic backgrounds attend a 
growing number of mosques, go to davaat (educational) workshops, and send their children to 
local medrasas. Many young people get scholarships to study at Islamic institutions abroad. All 
these activities occur under the supervision of the Muftiyat. 
 
Arguably a greater number of Central Asians find religious knowledge and inspiration most 
effectively transmitted outside the jurisdiction of the Muftiyat, in informal fellowships or within 
families and tight-knit communities. Informal study circles are particularly popular. Headed by 
one or two individuals with formal training, these are friendly sites for discussion, instruction, 
and debate. Male groups are often supervised by imams and thus have close ties to the official 
Islamic leadership. Because women are formally excluded from the official leadership, their 
religious fellowships are more independent from authoritarian institutions such as the state and 
the state-aligned Muftiyat. In these spaces, the dominant Islamic interpretation is asserted as a 
hegemonic discourse, but the context is such that debate and negotiation are possible. 
  
The study circle I describe here comprised between 12 and 15 Uzbek women who live in an 
urban region in southern Kyrgyzstan. When I knew them, in 2004 and 2005, the women were 
middle-aged with school-aged children, old enough to be somewhat independent from mothers-
in-law, but few of them had married children of their own.  
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 The women met to share knowledge and deepen their commitment to Islam, but gatherings were 
also an opportunity to trade neighborhood gossip, bazaar prices, business ideas, and reflections 
on the latest political scandals. The women reflected on the challenges they faced as women, 
members of an ethnic minority, and citizens of a nation in crisis. The women shared stories of 
the harassment they suffered because of the way they dressed, aired their frustrations with 
husbands who were not sufficiently “Islamiĭ” (pious), and helped each other resist the temptation 
to engage in activities the group agreed were haram (forbidden). In the first section of the paper, 
I describe the group as an educational fellowship, and discuss how Islam inspired in them a love 
of learning, a reason to engage with a complex textual tradition. In the second section of the 
paper, I describe the group as a site of discursive contest, a site where authoritarian islam, 
promoted by the Muftiyat and foreign groups, encountered competing discourses of distinctively 
Central Asian Islam. 
 
I. Education 
All of the members of the group observed namoz (prayer), fasting (Roza), and veiling in public. 
Beyond these observances, their levels of knowledge and commitment varied. Some women had 
formal training, such as from davaat workshops. Others could barely read Arabic. Rabia-aia, to 
whom all the others deferred, was not a regular member, but a senior woman in the community 
who visited the group as a form of “savob,” meaning a generous act committed without the 
expectation of anything but spiritual reward. She did not prepare assignments and attended only 
about half the meetings. When she was there, she maintained strict control of the meeting, 
interrupting the women when conversation strayed off topic, and giving harsh censure when it 
was due. 
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In Rabiya-aya’s absence, the meetings were supervised by Lola-opa or Nodira-opa. Lola-opa had 
been studying for a long time and her eldest son, who was sixteen, studied at a madrassa in town. 
She was unafraid to voice strong opinions or express intense emotions, and she had 
uncompromisingly high expectations of herself. Nodira-opa was one of a few women whose 
husbands were devout, and she had attended davaat workshops. She was quiet and soft spoken, 
but the intensity of her conviction was evident when she lectured on prayer or faith, two of her 
favorite topics, and in her ascetic tendencies; she was seemingly always observing extra fasts or 
prayers.  
 
The group met once a week, at a different woman’s house, between the morning and noon 
prayers. They gathered around a tablecloth or low table, holding books and notebooks. Each 
woman presented an individualized assignment, a recitation or reading of a passage from the 
Qur’an. The other members of the group corrected her as she read, assessed her progress, and 
assigned her a new passage if she was ready. When Rabiya-aya was there, she dominated the 
session, quick to criticize or even shame. At one meeting, Lola-opa was reciting, by memory, the 
relatively lengthy Sura Ya Sin, and Rabiya-aya scolded her. “You stretch vowels that should be 
short and cut off vowels that should be long. You add wow’s [و] where they don’t belong. I’m 
surprised. Usually you don’t have so many mistakes. Probably you didn’t study as much this 
week.” Lola-opa valiantly maintained her composure. “No, compared to how much I usually 
study, I studied 2 or 3 times as much.”  
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Lola-opa and Nodira-opa, in contrast, were more gentle. They corrected the reader with neutral 
voices often adding words of encouragement. Perhaps it was because they were members of the 
group. The women were neighbors and depended on each other in a number of contexts, that 
they were more dedicated to maintaining a positive spirit.  
 
When I first began attending the women only studied the Qur’an. As time passed, however, the 
themes of study expanded to include dowas, hadith, the 99 names of Allah, and ultimately an 
Uzbek interpretation of Qur’anic suras. These elements were added gradually, in response to 
various pressures. One week, Rabiya-aya mentioned that in the Arab world, “children learn 
hadith before they learn to walk. Two and three year olds who play in the street know at least 
twenty hadith. People here don’t know any.” Soon after, one of the women who owned a book of 
hadith brought the book to the study circle. At every meeting thereafter, the women passed the 
book around, each woman copying out an assigned hadith and at the following meeting, recited 
the passage.  
 
As the women became more familiar with the Qur’an, they grew interested in the significance of 
the suras. One week, Lola-opa announced, “I heard that if you don’t understand what the Qur’an 
means, it doesn’t matter how much you study Qur’an, how much you read and memorize, you 
are still not any better than someone who just knows the letters.” They all agreed and expressed 
the intention to learn more, but it was only Lola who actually took on the project. She brought 
the book to a meeting and announced, “From now on, my goal is that at every meeting I will 
present one or two suras and their meaning. I’m making the intention [niyet] to do that, and the 
rest of you will check up on me.” And she did, beginning back with the shortest suras, reciting 
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the Arabic and then the Uzbek. Although none of the other women took on this daunting project, 
the very fact that Lola did added to all of their education. 
 
Why this emphasis on study? First, because the women held scripture to be the authoritative 
source of knowledge about how to deepen their project. Second, because study would help them 
avoid sin, in the form of bidayat (innovation) and shirk (idolatry), which they held to be two of 
the gravest sins in Islam. Consider the following lecture, offered by Nodira-opa in response to a 
discussion of music and television. 
 
We don’t know what is bidayat and what is sunnat, and it all gets mixed together. That’s why we 
study. By reading Qur’an and hadith, we learn to distinguish bidayat from sunnat. Bidayat is 
increasing now. But if we study, we will find ourselves on the true path, and we will never get 
lost or confused. Rather than putting music on, better to listen to the Qur’an or an imam’s talk. 
Rather than watching bad television programs, watch religious programs.  
 
II. Negotiations 
Women in Kyrgyzstan have limited access to the male-dominated domain of official Islam, and I 
was no exception. My research into official Islam amounts to a few painfully formal interviews 
with clerics and an archive I collected of their publications, including newspapers, translated 
texts, and original tracts. This admittedly limited material confirmed my expectation that official 
Islam would look very similar to the Islam the women were learning in the study group—at least 
in terms of theology and doctrine.  
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Like the women in the study group, official Islam emphasizes scripture—specifically, the Qur’an 
and hadith. It also is trying to discourage bidayat and shirk. Consider the following passage, 
taken from the Muftiyat’s newspaper. [I should mention that the official religious leadership is 
largely ethnic Kyrgyz, and the women of course were Uzbek. The complexity of political and 
religious inclusion and exclusion are relevant to my topic, but I do not have time to discuss them 
today.] 
 
These days, it is important to be able to differentiate “kyrgyzchylyk” and “musulmanchilik.” 
There are still many superstitions in Kyrgyzchilik that go against Islam and are sinful. In the 
Qur’an it says Allah will gather all mushriktun [those who commit shirk] and ask the angels if 
these people worshipped them…the angels will say to Allah, you are our friend, not them. These 
people worshipped jinn... Shirk is the one sin God will not forgive. The Qur’an says, “if you 
commit shirk, all your good work will dissolve.” The one who commits shirk certainly can 
expect to be thrown into the fires of hell. 
 
The resonances between these two groups are no coincidence. Although women do not go to 
mosque and cannot participate in the religious leadership, the official leadership supervises the 
publication of the books the women read, the sermon recordings they listen to on cassette, and 
the schools, mosques, or workshops to which they, their husbands, or children go to learn about 
Islam, and from which they bring knowledge back to the group.  
 
Despite these resonances, the forms of transmission are strikingly different. Consider an issue the 
two groups agree about—life cycle observances such as nikyoh toi, sunnat toi, and various 
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funerary observances. Muslim households mark these events by organizing large feasts. These 
events play an important social and economic role in communities, but many devout Muslims 
have begun to avoid them because they often involve elements that are bidayat, such as excessive 
expenditures on food, or haram, such as alcohol and the mixing of the sexes.  
 
Funeral rituals, in particular, have come under scrutiny. The Mufti has issued several fatvalar 
regarding the proper way to observe a funeral. Although fatvalar have no legal force, the 
following ethnographic vignette describes a visit to a village in which Muftiyat officials apply 
their own methods of informal enforcement. I take this story from the Muftiyat’s newspaper, 
Islam Madaniyaty (Islamic Culture) (2003). The writer, a Muftiyat official, visits relatives in a 
village to attend a funerary observance. He is accompanied by other colleagues from the 
Muftiyat. He reports that since his last visit, much has improved in the village, notably the 
reduction of drunkenness, but many aspects of the funeral still did not conform to shariah. For 
example, the grieving family had killed several animals to provide food for a large number of 
guests, a practice that the devout regard as bidayat (innovation) because the Qur’an discourages 
putting a mourning family at such a disadvantage.  
 
The officials tell their hosts that their observance of the funerary rights included practices that 
“are not in shariat” [shariĭatta myndaĭ jokko]. They explain that a funerary feast creates hardship 
for the suffering family, especially if the family has young children. No food should be prepared 
in the mourning household, but rather neighbors and friends should provide the food. In the 
course of more discussion, the villagers question the officials’ guidance. The officials respond, 
“The Mufti issued a fatwa…and the Mufti’s fatwa has to be obeyed.” 
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The officials remind the villagers that they should read Qur’an only once at the gravesite for the 
deceased relative, an elderly man responds, “But in the past, we recited the Qur’an more times, 
in honor of other dead relatives. Why can we not do this?” The officials respond, “There are 
prescribed ways of reciting the Qur’an for relatives. Why don’t you and your sons and grandsons 
learn to read the Qur’an for your own relatives and recite for them regularly, rather than 
bothering us about how you have to wait until the excuse of someone else’s death to have 
someone read for them as well?” 
 
The authoritarian tone of religious authority, evident in this story and indeed throughout official 
writings differs significantly from negotiations over similar issue I witnessed at the study circle. 
Although the women were dedicated to Islam and to bettering their practice, they did not accept 
quickly or easily all the demands this new knowledge made on them. Consider a debate over 
attending life cycle ritual feasts. At one meeting, Lola-opa implored the women, “don’t go. It’s 
not in the Qur’an.” The other women turned to Rabiya-aya for a second opinion, she said they 
could go to tois… if they were [Islamii] toi. A few of the women looked suddenly deflated. The 
implications of Rabiya-aya’s words in their neighborhood was the end of any respectable social 
life. But others challenged these directives. They pointed out that they had accumulated debts by 
attending these events all their lives. Exchanges of food, money and other gifts at these feasts 
create patterns of debt that contribute to community solidarity and are a form of social security. 
The women couldn’t leave those debts unfulfilled by suddenly avoiding these gatherings. They 
would see their debts through and then stop.  
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One of the women turned to me to explain, “See, these other women have been doing this for a 
long time. They know a lot. The rest of us are just starting. We are still involved in practices that 
are bidayat because we don’t know any better. But we are trying, and someday we will stop. 
Right, girls? If it is not in the Qur’an to go to these gatherings then we will have to stop. But we 
aren’t stopping yet. We will keep going, even if it is a sin, until our debts are seen through.  
 
The exchange is interesting for two reasons. First, for the way authority is asserted and 
challenged. Rather than immediately surrendering to the leaders’ authority, the women in the 
study group insisted on debate, countering the leaders’ directives with social, economic, and 
familial concerns. Second, it is interesting because of the women’s attitude to sin. Rather than 
obsessively and fearfully rid their lives of anything resembling sin, most of the women were 
willing to suffer in the afterlife for the sake of fulfilling their debts to their neighbors and 
relatives in this life. 
 
Similar negotiations surrounded the topic of dress. All of the women covered the parts of their 
bodies deemed private (everything but face, hands, and feet) when outside of their houses, and 
yet the more devout women felt the others still needed to make changes. Although the women 
covered, few wore the hijab, by which they referred to a long, shapeless tunic. Instead, most of 
them wore high-waisted Uzbek dresses with long sleeves. Over the dress they wore a wool 
sweater or sweater-vest and underneath, colorful pantaloons. Nodira-opa addressed the issue one 
day:  
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Today I want to say something about religious action [amal]. For a long time, we have been 
talking about hijab. Many of you have said you want to wear hijab. You have made niyet. Now I 
don’t want to force anyone. It has to be true from your heart. Anyway, you yourselves will 
answer for it. But, I do want to say, if you have the niyet, why don’t you act on it? I know the 
problem for many of you is money. But now some of you have money. [She addressed one of the 
women.] I know your husband came back from Russia, so you have money now. Now is the 
time. The woman she addressed looked down and muttered an excuse. Nodira-opa was gentle but 
persistent. “We say we will, and then we don’t. And yet wearing hijab is farz [required]. It’s also 
a pleasure [rahot].”  
 
Another woman agreed, “I heard women who wear hijab say it’s a pleasure, they wouldn’t go 
back.” Nodira-opa continued, “You don’t have to buy the expensive hijab for 1000 som [about 
$25]. You just need 3 meters of cloth. How much is that? Three hundred som [about $7]?” The 
women voiced enthusiasm, and yet when it came to individual women making the change, there 
were more excuses, like Halima-opa, who lamented that she had purchased a hijab tunic, but it 
was too warm to wear at the time, in the spring, and she had no more money to buy more 
material. Again, the women expressed a desire to change, but not an immediate willingness. 
They effectively kept change on their own terms and in their own time. They did not 
immediately surrender to the leaders of the group, even though they acknowledged the leaders 
represented the side of Allah and salvation.  
 
In conclusion, private independent religious fellowships are a site of independent dialogue and 
contest, within the sphere of influence of official Islam and its supporters in the Kyrgyz state and 
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abroad, but distant enough that there is room for debate and resistance. I am not sure if meeting 
in the way they do is even legal, and it may be that the women are resisting authority on a 
number of fronts. Furthermore, recent research suggests study circles such as the ones I 
described have become a recruiting ground for Hizb ut-Tahrir and other branches of political 
Islam. Again, however, I expect these study groups are more sites for the negotiation of foreign 
ideologies and not indoctrination. But in this case again, Hizb ut-Tahrir and such radical groups 
also impose a new form of Islam in ways the women might similarly simultaneously accept and 
resist. 
 
My conclusion, unfortunately, is ambivalent. I have described a process of religious 
normalization backed by powerful institutional interests, both domestic and foreign. Despite 
models of instruction that are authoritarian and theologies that are authoritarian, the group keeps 
the process on its own terms. I have illustrated how normalization is resisted in small ways on a 
daily basis and for a variety of reasons, but especially for reason that have to do with deeply 
rooted indigenous notions of obligation to family, community, and ancestors. I cannot tell you 
whether the Uzbek women I described today all wear imported hijab robes (or copies of them), 
but if they do, their orientation do so as the beginning of a shifted orientation from local Muslim 
community, bound by shared obligation and ritual observations, to global ummah, bound by 
shared text and tradition. But women are uniquely positioned to respond to and negotiate the 
state and international support for normalization. 
